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Draft Recommendation
on European cooperation on the procurement of defence equipment
The Assembly,
(t) Considering that secunty and defence in Europe must be founded on autonomous military assets
rvhich are rnteroperable rvith those of our transatlantic allies;
(ii) Considering that these assets must rest on a European defence industry that is competitive on the
rvorld market;
(rn) Notrng that the defence budgets of western European countries are decreasing, or shor.ving in-
significant grorth, that markets are shrinking, competition is becoming keener and technological devel-
opments are leadrng to exponential increases in the cost of new \\'eapons systems;
0v) Taking the vrerv that Europe is tackling thrs situation u'ith a drspersed defence industrl', frag-
mented assets and surplus productron capacity,
(") Noting that these shortcomings are mamly due to the fact that each country has marntained as
many, lndcpendent national capacitics as possrble even though there ts no sufficientll' large market in
Europe to absorb rnvestment in research and development;
(w) Stressing that no single European country has a defence industry able to meet all its requtrc-
ments m this field;
(wt) Consrdering that a European market must constitute the bedrock of a European defence
industn',
(wt) Consrdenng that European cooperation is essential for the armaments sector and has to be
achieved b1, ratronahsing the industry, rvhrch implies restructuring at the national and European levels;
ftx) Takrng the vrerv that this process requires prior agreement to be reached among the states on the
definition of common requirements that would enable a sufficient market to be established:
(*) Welcoming the rnitiatives taken by the OCCAR countries vis-d-vrs WEU in order to obtain the
status of subsidrary body;
(n) Consrdering, however, that all the consequences of such a status must also take effect, including
the possibrlrty'for all member states to benefit from them;
(nr) Welcomrng the fact that the Euclid Cell has embarked on Phase 2 of its u'ork;
(nn) Consrdering that there rvrll be no satisfactory solution to thc harmonlsatron of requirements at
European level unless the process starts in the research phase;
(nv) Consrdenng that ri,hile there is no doubt that the creation of WEAO is a major step along the
road leading to a European arrnaments agenc),, the Charter by u'hrch it rs governed gives rise to senous
reservatrons.
(xu) Stressmg, moreover, the desirability of involving the central and eastern European countnes ln
any thinking and u,ork on armaments cooperation.
(xri) Welcomrng the creation of the WEU Mrlrtary Committee, u,hrch should provide a fitting frame-
rvork for the definition of common European defence requirements,
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE COLTNCIL
l. Urgently request the Military Committee to carry out a stud1, for the purpose of identrfurng com-
mon general and equrpment requrrements,
2. Invite the countries to provide a detailcd description of programmes for the replacement of mili-
tary equipment so that a European replacement timetable can be dralvn up for the short, medium and
long term;
3. Convene at the earliest possible opportunity a meeting of the WEU defence ministers rvhose
agenda rvould be confined to cooperation on defence equipment procurement;
4. Involve the central and eastern European countries in any thinking and u'ork being done in this
field;
5. Prepare and submit to all the governments concerned a draft agreement for the purpose of apply-
ing to WEAO provisrons similar to those of the Agreement of ll May 1955, and of giving contracts
concluded under the ausprces of WEAO a binding nature so as to give practrcal effect to the clause con-
ferring equalrtl' of status on all the members of that organrsatron,
6. Grant OCCARthe status of a subsidiary body rvith all the cffects that entails, in partrcular, par-
trcipation in its u'ork of all those membcrs wishing to be involvcd.
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Expla n atory M emoran du m
(submitted by Mr Lenzer, Rapporteur)
I. Politico-military aspects
l. European cooperation in the armaments
field has been a political and mrlitary objective
since the end of the second u'orld war. Finabel,
the Standing Armaments Committee, Eurogroup,
IEPG, WEAO and OCCAR are just some of the
steps along the long and difficult road towards
rvhat so far have been rather meagre results.
2. The Declaration on the role of WEU and
rts relatrons rvrth the European Union and u'ith
the Atlantrc Alliance appended to the Treaty on
European Unron b1, WEU member countrtes
mentions, x'ith reference to WEU's operatronal
role, the objectrve of strengthencd cooperation in
thc armaments field in thc context of "the estab-
lishment of a European arrnamcnts agenc1,".
3 Artrcle J.7.1 of the Trcaty of Amsterdam
states that "The Western European Uruon
(WEU) is an rntegral part of the development of
the Union providing the Unron rvrth access to an
operational capabrlitl'notably in the context of
paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing
the defence aspects of the common foreign and
securitv policy" Paragraph 2 specrfies that:
"questrons referred to in thrs Article shall include
humanitanan and rescue tasks, peacekeeprng
tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, including peacemaking" Finalll', para-
graph I adds that: "The progressrve framrng of a
cornmon defence pohcy' u,ill be supported. as
Member States consider appropriate, by coop-
cratron betu'een them in the field of armamcnts".
4 It rs quite clear that securrt)'and defence rn
Europe must be founded on autonomous militarl,
assets u'hrch are interoperable rvrth those of our
transatlantic alhes Such asscts in turn depend
on havrng a European defence industrl, rn'hrch is
competltlve on the internatronal market.
5 Unfortunatelv, hou'ever, the prcsent situa-
tron in the European defence industry shows little
drfference ivith the situation two )'ears ago des-
cribed in Assembly Document 1483 At a trme
u'hen defence budgets are decreasing, or shorving
insignificant grouth, markets are shrinlong,
competrtion is becomrng keener and the costs of
new weapons systems are rising exponentrally
due to technological development
6. Europe ls confronting these challenges
rvrth dispersed efforts on the part of its industry,
fragmented assets and surplus production capac-
rty. AIIthese shortcomings are mainly due to the
fact that each country/ persists in maintaining as
many, independent national capacities as possible
rvhen the European market is clearly not devel-
oped enough to absorb all the investment being
poured into R&D and industrialisation. The
srtuation in the United States rs drfferent in that
the home market there rs already sufficiently brg
to make it u'orthu'hilc for firms to invcst on a
largc scale u'rth rcasonable chances of success
7 All this confirms the vre*'that a European
markct must form the bedrock of a European
defence rndustry that is competitive on world
markets
8 There can bc no solution to these problems
ruithout a poohng of efforts Cooperation in
Europe started out as polrtrcal before embracing
economic objectives, but in the case of pro-
grarnmes. even those ln the aerospace sector
which have been a marked success, it falls short
of requirements rn both quantitative and qualita-
tive terms
9 The European defence rndustry must be
restructured at both natronal and European lev-
els It must consolrdate the trend that has started
torvards the creatlon of multrnational firms, cvcn
if thrs means rmprnging on arcas that states con-
srder to be stratcgrc Pnor to such rcstructuring.
states must agrce on a definition of thcrr cornmon
requlremcnts rn ordcr to create a sufficientlv
large market
l0 Furthermore, these changes are a pre-
requisrte for strengthened cooperatron ln whrch
both states and firms must agrec on a drvrsron of
responsrbrlrtres
I l. At the begrnning of thrs report ri'e take
note of the efforts berng made to provrde Europe
rr-ith a surtable rnstitutronal framervork to pro-
mote armaments cooperation The transfer of the
IEPG to WEU and rts transformation into
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WEAG were a step in the right direction The
subsequent creation of the Westem European
Armaments Organisation (WEAO) rvas also a
major achievement.
12 A fundamental remark is called for at this
Juncture. The only rvay to overcome the difficul-
ties cncountered in harmonisrng requirements at
European level is for the harmonisation process
to start as of the research stage. This is what
makes the Euclid programme (European coop-
eration for the long term in defence) so crucial.
Indeed, we are already feehng the benefits ofthe
initiative that rvas taken u'ith the creation of the
Euclid Cell.
13. While the creation of WEAO must, from a
political standpoint, be hailed as a malor step
fom,ard rn that rt has been given its ow.n legal
personality, its Charter nevertheless gives rise to
serious reseryatrons. Some considerations on thts
matter are given at the end of this report and the
Appendix contains comments on the legal status
of WEAO drafted b1, Mr Adam at the request of
the President of the Assemblv, Mr de Purg.
Table l
Trends in government expenditure on military R&D
in various countries over the period 1989-96
All figures are glven rn US dollars on the basrs of 1990 prices and exchange rates
Countrv 1989 1990 1991 1992 t993 r 994 1995 1996 1989-94
US 43 000 40 000 38 000 37 000 37 000 33 000 32 000 32 000 228 000
France 5 900 6 800 6 000 5 600 5 100 5 000 + 800 31 400
LIK ,1 000 3 900 3 700 3 400 3 600 3 200 3 .100 17 900
Germanv I 900 2 100 I 900 l 800 r 500 I 100 1 500 10 600
Japan 660 720 110 830 900 920 I 000 I 100 .r 800
Su'eden 670 650 780 680 640 190 560 3 910
Itali' 800 .+90 6',70 640 650 630 320 3 880
Indra 460 430 420 430 520 570 2 830
Sparn 440 490 4'70 390 320 270 280 2 380
South
Korea
150 230 240 270 320 320 350 370 I 530
South
Afnca
390 310 220 180 130 i30 130 I 360
Canada 250 230 190 200 180 180 150 | 230
Austraha 180 t'70 160 160 160 150 980
Sources OECD Main Scrence and Technologl' Indrcators, No 2
ment of Indra, Departmcnt of Screncc and Technologv, Rcsearch
number of vears. J Crlhcrs, Defence research and developmenl
Revrcrr', Vol 5, No. 5 (1996),p 42. and Tablc 7.10
(1996) and No 2 (1995). Govern-
and Development Statrsttcs. for a
tn South A-fnca. Afncan Securitv
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14 OCCAR is part of the overall effort being
made to achieve consrstency. The brlateral pro-
gramme rvhich was bom at the December 1993
Franco-German summlt m Bonn has become a
project r,r'ith four partrcipant countries (France,
Germany, Italy and the Unrted Krngdom) which
signed the agreement establishing the new or-
ganisation in November 1996 at Strasbourg
15. A feu'rveeks ago in Munich, the Director
of OCCAR, Mr Prev6t, described the pnnciples
underlying that agreement:
- 
the prrorrty to be grven to cost-effec-
tiveness in defence firms' procurement
policy decrsions,
- 
the need over thc longer term for har-
monisatron of user requirements and
various national technological policies;
- 
consohdation of the European indus-
trial base through greatly increased
competitiveness,
- 
abandon ofthe principle ofluste retour
b1' programme and an cffort to achieve
a better ovcrall balance spread over a
number of programmes and a period of
several years;
- 
the opendoor pnncrple, i.e. the possi-
brlrty for other countries to jorn
OCCAR sublect to two condrtions: ac-
ceptance of the five principles and sig-
nrficant participatlon ln a cooperatlon
programrne conducted under the aus-
prces of the organrsatron.
16. At therr Noordr'ryk meetmg rn 1994, the
French and German Defcnce Ministers sard that
rvhat u'as then a Franco-German rnitratrve could
bc considered as the precursor of a European
armaments agency. At that ttme, Defense News
took the vres' that this initratrve could become
one of the prllars of the future European arma-
ments agency
17 Moreover, in his address at the Munrch
Slmposium Mr Guddat, the German Natronal
Armaments Drrector, said that WEAO and
OCCAR u'ere complementar,'and u'ere pursumg
the same arms
18. OCCAR rs currentlv rvorking on a trme-
table for the integration of short- and long-term
prograrnmes and on rules marnly governing ac-
quisitions, contracts, financing and programme
management, although these u'ill not be ready
until late 1998 Furtherrnore, it u'ould appear
that the OCCAR member countries are doing
u'hat thel, can to ensure that the orgarusation ac-
quires a legal personality so that it can become a
WEU subsidiary body This solution rvould con-
firm the polrtrcal ri'ill to place the project rn the
context of the sole European organisation with
competence in defence matters.
19. It rs to be hoped that this process will meet
rvith success since it rvould solve the current
legal and political problems.
20 The decisron taken in May' 1997 to create
the WEU Military Committee rs of crucial
importance as it u'ill provrde the proper frame-
rvork for defining the joint requirements that need
to be met 
- 
in particular, the joint usc of equip-
ment.
21. These latter polnts were drscussed in
Munrch in the address grven by Colonel Vezinhet
on behalf of the Plannrng Cell While he cx-
plarned that thc dcfinrtron of mrlrtary require-
ments u-as not the Cell's main task. his descrrp-
tron of its rvork and the proposals he made for
the future \\'ere a consrderable source of inspira-
tion to the drscussrons at our Slmposium.
22. Colonel Vezinhet stressed in partrcular
that WEU could state its force 
- 
and therefore its
asset 
- 
requrrements through NATO and could
also make out the case for force compatibility. If
it rvishes to have some degree of autonomy,
WEU x'ill have to ensure that in follori'ing this
course of actron rt defines force targets covering
all rts requrrements through the use of European
assets
23 General Capizzano. the Itahan Deputy
Natronal Armaments Drrector. concluded his
address by' stating that the fact that "common
vle\\'s are u'rdely' sharcd in the defence sector at
operatronal level could be a srgnificant spear-
head to open the rval' to European integratron".
In hrs opening addrcss the Commrttee Charrman,
Mr Marshall, stressed that a great deal of polrtr-
cal rvill (hrtherto rncxrstent rn ),our Rapporteur's
opinion) was needcd to make progress rn this
field
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Country Exclusrvely, natronal
programmes
Cooperatrve
programmes
Imported equrpment Total
France 8l l5 4 100
United Kingdom 806 105 89 100
Germanl, l0 75 l5 100
Italv 30 50 20 na
Spain 55 t2 33 100
Srveden 70 15 l5 100
Table 2
hoportion of cooperative programmes in Europe (percentages)
Source: C. Serfati Les rndustnes europdennes d'armement; Paris' La doatmentafion frangarse. 1996,
page 59.
Note: The source of the statrstics for Italy u'as an interview given b1,an Itahan defence expert in July
t997
II. Industrial aspects
24. Europcan coopcration ln arrnamcnts im-
plies the creatron of structures and hnks betrvecn
the various European rndustne s, govcrnments
and institutrons. Such hnks should serve to facrli-
tate joint European armaments programmes and
procurement. The process of cooperation should
be considered rn the hght ofthe changing role of
European armies- u'hrch are no longer simply
vou'ed to terntonal defence.
25. Follourng the end of the cold rvar, Euro-
pean armed forces are mcreasinglv being called
upon to intervene outside their original terntorial
boundaries rn operatrons mvolvmg peacekeeping,
humanitarian interventton, policrng, cmbargo
enforcement and conflict prevention. These
forces should be flexible and ready,for rapid de-
ployment; thei' should include mixcd forces
(arm1,/naq'/air force), be multi-European and
possess hrgh+ech equrpment It is necessary for
Europe to ratronalise the equrpment of its armres
if such forces arc to be used successfully
Reachrng this goal xrll onh be possrble rf Euro-
pean armies buv equlpment from a common
European source Defining common goals con-
cerning military operatrons outhned under the
Petersberg iasks rs a precondrtron for European
cooperation.
26. Harmonrsation of rveapons procurement in
the light of European consolidation and interven-
tion for peacekeeprng purposes raises the ques-
tion of European cooperatron in defence pro-
grarnmes European defence companies have to
face economtc competitron on tuo fronts. internal
and external. When refernng to "rnternal'' eco-
nomlc competltlon, the focus su'rtches to thc
fragmentation of the Europcan defcnce rndustry.
27 In most cascs. European defence firms are
competing agarnst one another for sales contracts
u'ithrn the drmrnishrng European armamcnts
market Internal competrtron induces a reductron
in profit margms srncc competing firms u'rll tr1,
to secure a contract b1' making their product
more attractn,e to the buver, r e b1' offering the
lorvest possrble price. "Internal" competition also
diverts or reduces existrng resources u'hich could
be employed ln a more profitable u-ar,, such as
investment in research and development rlhere
Europe lags behrnd its transatlantic competrtor
28. The Unrted States spends four trmes as
much as Europe on research and development,
which explarns how' it can produce hrghlv com-
pctitrve advanced tcchnoiogy equrpmentr R&D
rs a key factor for thc sumval of the European
defence rndustrl' Producrng hrgh-tech equrpmcnt
enhances competltlveness on rrorld markets.
European firms have the abrlrtl' to produce such
equipment and R&D costs can be reduced
through loint programmes Cooperation should
take place in the rnitral stages of development in
order to avord anr' future mrsunderstanding bet-
u,een partners on the finahsation of the product
' lsee Tables 3 and 4) Address by Arr Chief Marshal
Sir Patnck Hine, Srmposium on European cooperation
on the procurement of defcnce equipment. Munich, 1-2
October 1997
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Table 3
Total US national defence, procurement, research and development, testing and evaluulion
budgets for the financial years I 947-97
Source The Defense Budget Proiect, based on US Department of Defense data.
Table 4
Pubtic funding for defence research and development work in the European Union
from 1975-93 (in millions of constant ecu at 1992 prices)
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29. Cooperation, however, is double-edged.
While it undoubtedlv reduces costs per country
and harmonrses equipment, it can lead to the
emergence of impedrmcnts, s,hich in turn can
slow down the programme. A partner will have
specific needs and demands to be included in the
prograrnme uhrch might clash rvith those of other
members of the group. In order to minimise any
future obstacles, it is necessary to analyse in
detail the requirements of each potential parher
prior to launching a programme. Cooperation in
equipment productron and procurement should
not be undertaken u'ithout clearly outlining the
parameters under u,hich the programme should
be developed as there is a risk that the paftner
nations ri'ill hamper the programme rvith the re-
sulting loss of the technologrcal edge the product
was intended to have
30 European industrral overcapacity com-
pounds the problem. In order to maintain its
technological and sales capacity, Europe has to
rcduce thc number of firms competing wrth one
another in spccrfic sectors such as aerospace or
armoured vehicles. Consolidatrng the industry
rvill not onll'reduce costs and securc a European
home market, but u'ill also result in the harmoni-
sation of equipment ri'rthin European armies.
31 Due to budgetary restrictrons, European
governments are rncreaslngll' forced to cut back
the procurement budgets of their armed forces.
Thrs process rs achreved b1, reducing the quantity
of equrpment (i.e. aircraft, tanks, naval vessels
etc..) In order to marntain their profit margins,
European defence firms are forced to increase
unit pnces and/or lncrease exports. Increasing
unit prices further u'eakens a firm's competitive-
ncss Increasing exports becomes the rational
solutron for marntarnrng sales and profit margms
32 Hou'ever, certarn natrons have restricted
access to markets because their national defence
mdustnes adopt export pohcrcs rvhich take into
consrderatron the humanrtarian track record of
the rmporting natron. But the biggest obstacle
and danger to the European defence industry
comes from the Unrted States' defence sector
33 Over the past decade, the US has strongly
consohdated its defence industry through mergers
of giant companles such as Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas, Lockheed MartrnA.lorthrop Grumman
and RartheonlHughes By reducing "rnternal"
competrtion. the US has allorved its mdustr)' to
fully focus on external markets. This process has
helped North American companies spread their
costs and redeplol' resources previously allocated
for deahng rvith "rntemal" competitron to re-
scarch and development
34. The defence industry produces highll,
competrtrve equipment at lorv cost thereby caus-
ing unit prices to drop. The consolidation of the
American defence rndustry has made it a formi-
dable and highly, competitive sector. It should be
noted, hou'ever, that thrs process u,as onlv made
possrble through sheer political will and financial
incentives from governments.
35. The US also has the advantage of being a
single nation rvhere the issue of equipment pro-
curement and forcrgn policl' rs not as problematic
as in Europe "[ ] the total defence-related tum-
over rn the US u'as about $86 billion with a
comparable figure for Europc of about S32 5
billion. The figure for Europe is roughly 38%o of
the figure for the US"2 The consolidated pri-
vatel,v-run Amerrcan defence rndustrv enjoys an
oligarchrc natronal market. *'here competition is
scarce. Europe conscquently suffers from
transatlantrc competrtron, u'hrch merely agga-
vates the "intemal" drfficultres faced bv its own
defence industry'.
36. Europe's problem is that it is composed of
a variety of natrons, rvrth divergrng goals and
armament procurement needs, no clearly defined
corrrmon foreign policy and a diminishing Euro-
pean defence market The European defence in-
dustry suffers from the coexrstence ofprivate and
nationahsed firms Consohdatron rs impeded by
thrs environment as prrvate firms are reluctant to
conduct loint prograrTrmes rvrth nationalised
firms, rvhose economlc strateg), rs influenced by
politrcal decrsrons
37 . Nationahsed firms. because of political
mvolvement. do not als'avs act according to the
same economic rules as the private companles
Pnvatised rndustn' exrsts solely for thc pulpose
of making profits The goals of govemment-run
firms, horvever, are more ambrguous as thel,take
in economic and polrtrcal elements
' Address by Mr Graham Woodcock: Symposrum on
European cooperation on the procuement of defence
equpment, Muruch, t-2 October 1997
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38. With most of Europe facing an unem-
ploymcnt crisrs, govcrnments are reluctant to
privatise therr defence industnes since this proc-
ess almost certarnly imphes restructuring and job
losses. BAe is a pnme examplc of this. Before
berng privatrsed the companv employed an estr-
mated 130 000 people in 1988. By 1995, because
of restructunng. rts labour force was reduced to
about 40 000 It should be noted however. that
follori'ing the privatrsation and restructuring
process, the company has achieved an unprece-
dented level of competitiveness, with sales of
f7.5 billion Over 80% of BAe turnover is gen-
erated overseas x'hrch emphasises the need for
European defence firms to turn tou'ards foreign
markets3.
39 Acqurrrng export markets ovorseas, horv-
ever, imphes increased equlpment competrtive-
ness, u'hether it bc technological or financtal.
Keeping the rndustry nationahsed mrght save
lobs in the short run through the use of economic
protectil'e measures. but because of strongcr US
competition European nations might be forced to
shut dour therr defence industries completelv rn
the long run due to therr lack of competrtrveness
on rr-orld markets. Decreasrng competitiveness
imphes lou-er sales profits and feu'er resources
available for research and development.
40 As nationahsed and./or uncompetitive firms
continue to survrve through artificial means (r e.
continued government subsrdies), there rs a pos-
sibiliq' that the technologrcal quality of their
products urll decrease, thus u'orsening their de-
chnrng sales figures A proper analy,sis of the
envrronment and condrtrons rn which European
firms should be pnvatised is essentral for therr
survival
4l Thc mrght of North Amerrcan firms poses
not onlv a threat to the European defcnce rndus-
try but also to European defence strategy,and
forergn poho' If thc European defcnce rndustn,
drsappears through lack of competrtrveness and
fragmentatron. allou'rng the Untted States to be
3 Address b1' Arr Ctuef Marshal Srr Patnck Fhne; Srm-
posium on European cooperatton on the procurement of
defence equrpment, Munich, l-2 October 1997.
come the u,orld's ma;or weapons manufacturer,
Europe lvill no longer have any choice in arma-
ments procurement and rvill consequently bc de-
pendent on American tcchnology and arms sales.
This will have a direct effect on European for-
eign pohc1, and defence strategy as European
nations might no longer be ablc to act indepcnd-
ently without the Unrted States' consent. It is
essentral for Europe's defence industry to survive
if rt rvishes to remain independent of the Unrted
States
42. Independence, hou'ever, does not imply
isolation. The transatlantic link should be vieived
as a strong and posrtrve structure for peace and
secuntl'. NATO remains Europe's only dl,namic
military defence structure currentll' capable of
deahng rvrth instability around the world and
morc specrficallv rvithrn the geographic bound-
ancs of Europc Europeans and Americans
should vieu' the development and strengthenrng
of NATO as positivc step tou'ards European
securitr'
43 Some European parhamentarians have
hou'ever stressed that x'hrle NATO is a pou,erful
instrument in European secunt),, rt might be too
Iarge and slou'to tackle certain tasks. NATO is
strll trying to redefine rtself in the post-cold u'ar
era. Institutions such as WEU are more suited,
because of their srze and flexrbilin,. to intenene
in certam areas and in predefined conditrons,
such as those outlined for the Petersberg tasks.
44 WEU and NATO should not be perceived
as competing but rather as complementarl, rnsti-
tutlons Once again. hou'u,,er, rf these instrtutrons
are to take actron rn future theatres of conflict,
thc forces rnvolvcd must havc harmonrscd
equrpment NATO has already harmonrsed rts
forces rn drfferent arcas If WEU rs to lntcn,cnc
u'rth the use of armed forces, rts task irrll be
facrlrtated rf troops use thc same equipment. im-
pl1'rng convergcnce of 
.;ornt armaments pro-
grammes and procurement (see Table 5).
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DOCUMENT 1587
Table 5
Comparison of the numbers of different armaments produced by the industries of Europe
(the Twelve plus the five EFTA countries) and the United States (situation at 30 June 1993)
Category
Number of armaments European producer
countries
Europe US
Assault tank 4 I UK, F, FRG, IT
Armoured infantry
fighting vehicle
16 3 F (3x), FRG, UK (2x),
IT (3x), SU, GR (2x),
SP (2x), AUT, CH
Self-propelled 155 mm
horvitzer
3 I F, FRG, UK
Fighter-bomber 1 5 F (2x), UK, SU,
FRG/IT/UK,
SP/FRG/UK/IT
Ground attack/trarning 6 I UK, SP, IT (2x),IT/Br,
FRG/F
Strategic bomber 0 I
Heaw transport arrcraft I 3 IT
Anti-tank helicopter 7 5 F (2x), UK, IT (2x),
FRG, FRG/F
Hearl'transport
helicopter
2 4 F/FRG, IT/UK
Assault gun 7 I B. F, UK, SP, FRG,IT,
AUT
Portable surface-to-ai r
missrle
4 I F, UK (2x). SW
Antr-ship missile 9 3 F (2x). UK (2x), lT
(2x). Nor, SU, FRG
A.rr-to-arr mrssile 8 4 F (3x), UK (2x), SU,
IT (2x)
Antr-air missile 3 3 UK, FffRG, IT
Antr-radar missrle 3 3 F, UK, IT
Anti+ank mrssrle 8 5 F/FRG (2x). UK.
ITlBr. SU. SP/US
Antr-submanne torpedo 9 2 UK (2x). SU (3x). IT.
FRG, F (2x)
Frigate ll I F (3x), UK, FRG (3x),
NL, SP, DK. IT
Mrne hunter 4 2 F/NL/B. UK. FRG, IT
Arrcraft carrrer (planes
and hehcopters)
3 I UK. IT, SP
Arrcraft carner (planes) I I F
Crurser-destrover 0 I
Conventronal
submarme
,7 0 FRG (3x). IT. NL. UK,
SU
Nuclear attack
submarinc
2 I F, UK
Total t25 53
ll
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III. Conclusions
45. When organising our Symposium, onc of
the main ideas rvas that representativcs from the
central and eastem European countries should be
invited to attend both as speakers and partici-
pants, thereby contributing to the discussrons.
46. Unfortunately, of all the speakers invited
from those countnes, only the Polish Vice-Minis-
ter for Armaments and Infrastructure, Mr
Krzystof Wegrz1.n, rvas able to attend. While his
address was most mteresting, it did not enable us
to assess the vieivs or position of the central and
eastern European countnes as regards the objec-
trve of our Symposium.
47 There rs no doubt that the situation in
u'estern Europe is complex enough as it is rvith-
out the addrtron of further quantitative and
qualitativc elements. Neverthelcss, all these
countries are extrcmell, keen to join the European
Unron and WEU rn the vcry near future A cau-
trous but reasonable approach to allow them to
partlclpate progressively and in a manner strll to
be decided rn the thrnking and work of our Or-
ganlsatlon on armaments cooperation rvould
therefore seem to be in order.
48 Mr Wegrzrn confirmed Poland's mterest
in taking part in the bilateral and multilateral
activities of a European annaments agency and
joimng multrnational research and development
prograrnmes Poland rvas already involved in
screntific and technical cooperative rvork on ar-
maments u'rth the United States, Su,eden, the
Netherlands and u,rth NATO agencies and
committees Why'then should it not do the same
u'rth WEU?
49 General Schheper, moreovcr> sard in hrs
addrcss that France had put fonvard a proposal
for creating thc status of an armaments partner in
order to develop the dralogue with non-member
countnes of WEAG This proposal had also met
urth Germanv s approval and u'ould be referred
to the Conference of National Armaments Drrec-
tors rvhere. rf accepted. it u'ould be submitted for
the minrsters' approval
50 As regards the negotiations the OCCAR
member states are conducting with WEU u'ith a
vrew' to obtarnrng the status of a WEU subsidiarv
bodl', r'our Rapporteur can onl1, rvelcome this
rnitratrve rn the hope that it rvill meet u,ith suc-
cess at the earliest possible opporhrnity, but he
would stress that granting OCCAR the status of
subsidiarl'body' must be accompanred by all the
consequences, in partrcular the extcnsion of that
status to all member countries desinng to benefit
from it.
51. In your Rapporteur's opinion, Mr Heis-
bourg's proposal to convene.a meeting of defence
ministers rvhich u'ould be devoted exclusivcly to
armaments procurement is extremely interesting.
Although this proposal concerns the European
Unron defence ministers, it rvould be logical for
the meeting to take place at the level of the de-
fence ministers of WEU, the only European or-
ganrsailon ivith competence in thrs field, and in
any event for matters falhng within the remrt of
the European Union to be dealt with subse-
quently. Among other thrngs these include the
questions raised bv Artrclc 223, t.e. assistance
for industry, exports and dual-use technologies
52 As Mr Woodcock pornted out, European
cooperation on equlpmcnt procurement can only
be succcssful rf rt rests on the foundatron of a
polrtrcal u'rll amongst the governments involved
to share therr responsrbrlrties in defence and se-
curitv matters This rmplies going beyond com-
fortable rvords to actually,making real progress
53 Srr Patrick Hrne took an extremely reahs-
tic vrerv of the future of the European defence
industry n'hen he said there rvas only room in
Europe for a srngle aircraft prograrnme to suc-
ceed Eurofighter and Rafale and that if the gov-
ernments u'ere unable to reach agreement on it,
the pro;ect rvould qurte srmply ne!,er see the light
ofday
54 He also sard that ri'hrle OCCAR rvas a
useful first step. the real test u'ould be rvhether
the governments could dccrde to make a clean
swcep of thetr o\\x procurement servlces mstead
of marntarnrng them to spy on OCCAR's every
actron. If thel' reallv managed to do thrs, rt u'ould
be a practrcal demonstratron of a genuine politr-
cal resolve to scftle thc current problems.
55 Mr de Purg. the Presrdent of the Assembly',
closed the Slmposrum bv stressmg that WEU rs
definitelv the organisation that can take the nec-
essan' actton to promote real European coopera-
tlon on defence equrpment procurement Anl,
delay' in the process of ratronahsatron u'ill do
irreparable damage to our defence industry,,
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without rvhich it rvill be drffrcult to establish a
Europcan defence identrty. Our gol'emments
must be persuaded of the urgency of the situation
and startrng thinking nou, about the remedies that
must bc applied.
,l<
l. ,k
56. Written Questrons 344 and 345, put to the
Council on 13 May 1997 by, Mr De Decker,
Chairman of the Defence Committee, prompted
the Councrl to explain the reasoning behind its
decision to extend to countries that are not signa-
tories of the 1954 modified Brusscls Treaty cer-
tain effects of the Paris Agreemcnt of l l May
1955 on the status of WEU, natronal representa-
tives and mternational staff.
57 . The substance of the Council's reply to
Question 344 rs that the countrics concerncd de-
cided "to make available WEU's intemal legal
personalrtv to the WEAG countries" sub.;ect to
therr adopting "every proper measure ri'ithrn therr
oun lcgal svstem" in accordancc urth therr
undertaking to respect the content of the lcgal
personalrtv of WEAO as derrving from the Parrs
Agreement. As regards the signatorl' countrres,
"the adoption of the Charter ... commrts them rn
therr turn to taking every proper step This
firm undertakrng has been explicitly recognised
by thc WEU Council"
58. This means that. in both cases. the legal
status of WEAO urll be defined bv vrrtue of na-
tronal legislatron in the member countnes. lvhich
has still to be promulgated, and not b1'the apph-
cation of an rnternational agrcement There is no
reason to assume that these lcgal provisions u,ill
be the same in all the countnes concerned, nor
that thel' s,rll enter into force at the same trme in
each of them. to say' nothrng of horv thc parha-
ments in each of these countnes urll react u,hcn
the governments give thcm notice to applv the
"firm undertakmgs" thev have gir,'en u,rthout
submittrng them for ratificatron Undcr these
circumstances. there ls no guarantee of anv reci-
procitl, rn the applicatron of the relcvant tcxts to
cooperation ventures involr,rng both states that
have acceded to the modified Brussels Treaty and
thosc that, becausc thel'have not subscrrbed to it,
are not sublect to the 1955 Paris Agrcement
59. In rts repll' to Questron 345, the Councrl
informs us that, rather curiouslr,, Articles l7 and
18 of the Pans Agrcement are not applicable to
the parliamentary delegations of non-member
countries, in the same \\'ay as Artrcles I I to 15
are not apphcable to their representatives in the
Council and its subsidiary bodres, but that in
contrast Articles 19 to 26 apply' on the basis of
the exchange of srdc letters All this would ap-
pear to be someu'hat inconsrstent rf the accepted
view is that the Council, on the one hand, and the
Asscmbly, on thc other. are supposed to discuss
- 
among other things 
- 
matters concerning the
WEU subsidiary bodies and, by' implication,
those concernrng WEAO. Exclusron of this sort
is in blatant contradiction of the commrtments 
-
entered into and rcaffrrmed srnce 1992, in Bonn,
Petersberg and Ostend 
- 
regarding the particrpa-
tion on an equal footrng of non-member countries
of WEU in the actrvrtres of WEAO
60. It should also bc noted that paragraph I I
(a) of the WEAO Charter provrdes that financral
responsibilrties ansing from WEAO actrvitres are
to be borne b1,the particrpating states, and that
paragraph 1l (b) declines the optron of natronal
jurisdictron rn favour of an arbitration process
Under these conditions. rt rs difficult to rmagme
that thc parliaments of the countnes concerned
rvrll be prepared to vote appropnattons for the
funding of WEAO actrvrtres u,hen the1, have not
ratrficd its Charter, and harder strll to see horv
natronal courts urll act rn the event of an abuse
of pou'er on the part of one of the bodies of
WEAO u'hen concluding contracts All these
authoritics rvill bc even less inchned to abide bv
the principles set out rn the Chartcr glven that in
12 of the countries concerned. therr constitutron
requires parhamentan' approval of any, agree-
ment affecting natronal legrslatron and the fund-
rng of an rnternatlonal organrsatlon Of their
number, onh'Turkel'entered a reservation as to
the compctence of its parliamcnt rn the exchange
of side lctters at Ostend
61. In rts repll' to Wnttcn Questron 345. thc
Council states in support of rts thesrs that "no
WEU member state has expressed an ob-;ectron to
the opcratron of thc WEAO bv rcason of its
composrtron'' One can take due note of thrs but
if the Ostend documents u'ere not conveved to the
parhaments, nhrch are the vrtal componcnts of
democratic countnes. rt rs drffrcult to see hox'the
absence of an oprnron of those parhaments on
texts that rvcrc not referred to them could be
l3
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taken as imply'ing their approval, let alone ratifi-
cation.
62. In fact, everything rvas done as if the fear
of opening a dcbate on a possible rcvision of the
modified Brussels Treaty, or even on the compo-
nents of a European security, defence and arma-
ments pohc-v, led the governments to dissociate
the internal personality of the organisation from
its international personality, as if one drd not de-
rive from the other, when the very basis of the
organlsatron's internal personality rs an intema-
tional Treaty. A revision of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty u,as essential to integrate WEAO in
WEU's legal system A specific international
instrument should have been indispensable to
grve WEAO its ou.n legal status
t4
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APPENDIX
Comments on the legal status of
the lYestern European Armaments Organisation
l. The creation of the legal status of WEAO
calls in the first instance for an explanation of a
number of features peculiar to it. Once the 13
member countries of WEAG (the Western Euro-
pean Armaments Group) had unanimously re-
quested the WEU Council of Ministers to grant
their Group the status of a WEU subsidiary
body, the ensuing process comprised three
stages.
2. The first stage, constituting the main legal
source of that status, rvas the adoption (on
19 November 1996) by the WEU Council 
-
composed of representatrves (of the foreign af-
fairs minrsters) of the l0 member countries 
- 
of
the Charter of the Western European Armaments
Organrsation (WEAO) grantmg it the status of a
WEU subsidrarl, bodl' rn pursuance of Artr-
cle VIII 2 of the I954 modrfied Brussels Treat1,.
The Charter also defined the aims, functions,
organisatron and operation of WEAO together
ri-ith the rulcs governrng the conclusion by rt of
an)' agreements and contracts, its assets, com-
position. dissolution and the rvithdrawal of a
state from it
3. The second stage in the definition of
WEAO's legal status consisted of an exchange of
letters. on the occasion of the WEU Council
meeting at l0 held rn Ostend on 19 November
1996, betri'een the Chairman-in-Office of the
WEU Councrl of Ministers and the foreign af-
fairs mrnisters of Nonvav and Turkey. In the
case of Denmark 
- 
a WEU observer country as
compared urth Nonr,a1, and Turkey, as WEU
assocrate members 
- 
the lettcrs that had bcen
exchanged on l4 March 1994 s'hen the functions
of the Independent European Programme Group
(IEPG) u-ere transferred to Westcrn European
Union. that is to thc Western Europcan Arma-
ments Group (WEAG), u'ere considered to be a
substitute.
4. Bv virtue of the exchange of letters, each
of the three countries agreed to appll'the I I May,
1955 Paris Agreement on ''the status of Western
European Unron, natronal reprcsentatives and
internatronal staff' m relatron to WEAO activi-
ties. Each of the three countries also sought as-
surances as to its full partrcipation and rts rights
and obligations ln WEAO, on the basis of the
communique issued in Bonn by the 13 defence
ministers on 4 December 1992 and of the Decla-
ration by the WEU Council of Ministers in
Rome, upon the transfer to WEU of the functions
of the IEPG rvhich had become WEAG, defining
the six principles that rvere to govern the trans-
fer.
5. In his reply', the Chairman-in-Office, not-
ing the undertaking grven by each of the three
countrres to appll,the 1955 Paris Agreement ln
relation to WEAO activitres, confirmed in each
case their full particrpation and equal rights and
obligations and referred in thrs connection to the
abovementroned Rome Declaration and Bonn
communique. Hou'cver, in his repl,v to the Nor-
u'egian and Turkrsh Mrnrsters. the Chairman-in-
Office confirmed their countnes' full participa-
tion rn WEAO "as an cxpression of their status
as WEU associate members''.
6. The third stage in the acquisitron of
WEAO's legal status consisted of the Memoran-
dum of Understanding signed bv the defence
ministers of the 13 WEAO countries (10 + 3)
These x'ere the (defence) ministers of WEAO 
-
not the (foreign affairs) ministers of the WEU
Council, the High Contracting Parties to the
Brussels Treatl, 
- 
u'ho hal'e a collective guard-
ianship of the exercise of (mrnrstenal) political
authority'over WEAO
7 Moreover the transfer of actrvitres from
WEAG to WEAO madc thrs bodv of ministcrral
authontv a requlrement.
8 One consequence of thrs rs that, unhkc the
foreign ministers, the defence minrsters do not rn
principle have pou,ers of drplomatrc reprcsenta-
tron. They' do not srgn treatlcs but rather
"technical" agrcements (conccrnrng defence) by
an implicit or exphcit delegatron of porvers by
their forergn affarrs colleagues. Thrs being so,
thc scope of the Memorandum of Understanding
rvas bound to be hmited, i e to implementatron of
thc Charter
l5
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9. Thus the scope of the Memorandum of
Understanding is defined as covering "the prin-
ciples to be applied m the operatton and admini-
stration of WEAO, as defined in Section IV of
thc Charter" (Sectron 2.1 of the MOU).
l0 The second consequence concerns the role
assigned to the 13 defencc ministers in the defi-
nrtion of the status of WEAO as decided b1' the
foreign affairs ministers of the l0 (WEU Coun-
cil) The defence mintsters could do no more
than take note or recognise "that the Council of
the Western European Union has decided to es-
tablish the Western European Armaments Or-
ganisation as a subsidiary body under Article
VIIL2 of the modrfied Brussels Treaty" by vrrtue
of a Charter adopted by the foreign affatrs mints-
ters of the 10, not the 13. This constitutes thc
first infnngement of the dual principle of equal
nghts and obhgations and of full particrpation, as
estabhshed in the cxchange ofletters.
t I It rs likelv that difficulttes rvtll arise rn the
interpretation and apphcatron of thc WEAO
Charter as rcgards thosc of rts provisions to
uhrch there rs no reference. in the Memorandum
of Understanding. to rclations rvtth non-member
countrics of WEU that have not adopted the said
Charter In fact it apphes to them onll' ll'1r.r.
reference rs made to the application of a specific
provision or s'here such a provision is repro-
duced in the Memorandum of Understanding
12 Another legal peculiantv may arise m the
case of partnerships (paragraph 25 of the Char-
ter) betrveen tu'o partrctpants netther of whtch rc
a member o.f WEU It rs not hard to imagrne all
the varrous problems that urli arise m such a
case *'herc the tu'o partners/particrpants rvrll
have to applv to thcrr act[rtics "as appropriate",
or be sublect to the applicatron of, the I I May
1955 Pans Agreement on the pnvilegcs and tm-
munltles grantcd to WEU rn respect of taxes,
dutres and charges. pursuant to Section 13 I of
the Memorandum of Undcrstanding srgned at l3
13 The case of partnershtps betu'een two or
more partlcrpants u'hrch u'ere not members of
WEU could run up agarnst obstacles both as rc-
gards a country"s natronal lcgislation and its in-
ternal bodres (includrng the courts)
14 In contrast. the definrtron of WEAO as a
WEU subsrdrary bodl pursuant to Article VIIL2
of the modrfied Brusscls Trcatv rvill not just
create problems but is bound to result in an tm-
possrble srtuation from the legal point of vierv.
15 To begrn u'ith. tu'o questions have to be
asked rvhat role does WEAO have as a subsidr-
ary body,created w\thin the framework ofWEtJ?
Can the Councrl create WEAO as a subsidrary
body' that includes non-member countries of
WEU?
16. The first question concerns the specific
nature of WEAO Paragraph 3(a) of its Charter
states that it rvas created rvithin the framervork of
WEU and pursuant to Article VIII.2 of the
modified Brussels Treaty rvhich authorises the
Council to set up any subsidiary body considered
necessary.
17. But the statutor)' texts (modified Brussels
Treatl'and Pans Agreement) do not make provi-
sron for an1, bodres. strll less subsidiary ones,
created wrthn the framework of WEU. The
bodres for u'hrch provlslon ts made are those set
up "under the freaty" They are the bodies that
are part of WEU (scc Artrcle 12 of the Paris
Agreement ), not bodres for u'hich it provrdes a
framervork and rrhich as such have ties or rela-
trons rvith rt.
18. Furthermore, under the Paris Agreement
the WEU subsrdiary bodres constrtute one of the
components of WEU because thel' are actually
part of rt and do not come ''rvtthtn the framework
of the WEU".
19. The second question ts rvhether a body can
be consrdered to be a subsidrary' one rvhere it is
created to implement tasks ansrng out of the
Treaty (sce the abovementtoned provrsion of the
WEAO Cha(er). but u'here rts composttion also
includes statcs rrhrch are not partv to the modr-
fied Brussels Treatv and are thtrd states com-
pared u'ith the Contractrng Partics
20. The ansuer rs clearlv that rt cannot, glvcn
that rn rts rephcs to thc Assembll' (see tn particu-
lar paragraph 4 of rts reph' to Wntten Question
300). thc Councrl has persrsted uith rts assertton
that associate membcrs remaln outstde the modt-
fied Brussels Treatl'
21. The ambiguitv rn s'hrch the Council has
consistently'cloaked the legal nature of the status
of a WEU assoclate member country is now
crcating drfficultres. not to say serious problems,
for WEAO
t6
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22. Besides this, the WEU subsidiary bodies
enjoy the status accordcd to the Organisation
under the Paris Agreement because they are a
component of WEU (see the definition of the Or-
ganisation in Article I(a) of the Agreement). It rs
because they are an integral part of WEU that
they have the jurrdical personality and capacities
accorded to the Organrsatron Since they come
under the "lcgal umbrella" or cover of WEU,
they acquire that pcrsonalitl, and those capacrtres
ex fficro. They are not granted any separate or
individual status
23. There rs absolutely no necd for the per-
sonality and capacrties of the subsidrary bodies
to be specified as is done in paragraph 8 of the
WEAO Charter.
24. It rs clearlv because there are serlous
doubts or obstacles as to u,hether WEAO can be
considered a WEU subsidiary bodl' that the
abovementioned provrsron (paragraph 8) of the
Charter u'as included. Such doubts or obstacles
have their source in the fact that WEAO com-
priscs not I0 but 13 states. Thus, although
WEAO u'as created b1'the WEU Council at l0
and therefore conforms to the definitron in Article
l(c) of the Pans Agreement as regards one of rts
characteristics, rt ceases to qualifi' as a subsidi-
ary bodl' given that thc number of rts mcmbers
exceeds that of WEU itself, thereby creating a
difference in the composrtion of WEU and
WEAO
25 The Hrgh Contractrng Partres are not at
hbertl'to create at therr convcnrcncc bodres thei'
dub subsrdran at therr orrn discretron Conven-
tronal internatlonal larv prohibits such a practice
(see in thrs connection Article 130 of the Chartcr
of the Organisation of Amerrcan States and Scc-
tron I of Annex I to the Agrecment on the apph-
cation of the Montego Bay, Convention, signcd rn
Neu'York on 29 Jul1' 1994)
26 The subsidrary bodres that exist m contrast
to the prrncipal bodrcs must be integrated in the
Organisatron and their po\\,ers must bc compatt-
b/e s'lth the rnstrument establishrng the Organr-
sation, othenr-rse the srtuation bccomes one of an
imphcit statutor)' revrsion of that instrument
But in a 
.ludgment delivered on 14 December
l97l the Court of Justrce of the European Com-
munities rn Luxembourg ruled agarnst the proce-
dure of an implrcrt revisron of statutory texts
27. Thrs anomaly gives rise to situations that
call into qucstron WEU's legal personalitl' and
its responsrbilrtl,.
28. Indecd, under the terms of paragraph I I of
the WEAO Charter, WEU is in fact responsible
vis-a-vis thrrd parties for the activities of
WEAO Horvever rn the final anall'srs it is the
WEAO member states that would have to bear
the consequences of any responsrbrlrtl', grven that
once WEU assumed its responsibilrtl'proper, the
logic of subsuming WEAO's legal personalrty rn
that of WEU ri'ould rcqurre the WEAO partrci-
patlng states (10 + 3) to pay thcrr oun debt,
arising out of WEAO itself. Thus, in accordance
u'ith paragraph I I of the Charter, the ten WEU
member countrrcs have to pay twrce, once in their
capacitl' as members of WEU, the rnrtial debtor,
and then again rr'rthrn WEAO u'hrch is ultimatell'
responsible for bearing anv costs and reimburs-
ing the initial debtor Thrs absurd situation
stems from the fact that paragraph I I makes no
provlslon for an1' compcnsation mechantsm and
that after rt has been established that the lcgal
personalrty' of WEAO is subsumed rn that of
WEU. it suddenlv reappears and, n'orse strll, the
legal personaiity of the member states
(participants) is also rnvolved u'hen rt comes to
rermbursements Thus WEAO's legal personal-
rtv rs relativised and thc subsumptron of one per-
sonality rn the othcr, as specified rn paragraph
8(b), is ignored, rn the absence of anv settlement
29. It is unhkell, that the authors of the
Agreement endou,rng WEU rvith a legal capaclt)'
envrsaged such an intelpretation of Artrclc 3
thereof or a provrsron statrng that "The WEAO
u'rll share m thc internatronal personalrtl, of the
WEU"I Such u'ording rs u'rthout precedent in
convcntronal rntcrnatronal lau'. The legal provl-
sions govcrning responsrbilrtl' and thereforc thc
legal personalitl, sP WEAO are \/eI]' parttcular
here rn that they hft thc "r,erl'' that laul'ers con-
srder cmbodl' the vcn' concept of legal pcrson-
alrty.
rfh. engUrtl tcxl of paragraph 8fb) of the Charter rs
more drsconcerbng than the French text rvhrch statcs
tlut "The \\EU urll porfiupate rn thc tnlcrnalonal
pcrsonalrtl' of WEI-I' If the personal{t' s shared on a
joint bass, responsrbrhtl' should be shared rn the same
u'av and tlus should exclude ary rermbursemcnts being
made by one orgarusation to the other and. u'hat rs
more, b1'their mcmbers
t1
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30 This partrcularity is clearlv deliberate and
intentional as the WEU Council has nevcr seen
fit to revise thc modified Brussels Treaty despite
thc changes that have come about rvith the crea-
tion of the status of associate member, associate
partner and observer
3 l. The varrous categories of status decided
on in Rome, Petersberg and Kirchberg are lncon-
ceivable rvithout a revision of the modrfied Brus-
sels Treaty. Similarly', thc status of WEAO, as
decided in Ostend, is not consistent with either
the modified Brussels Trcatv or the Paris Agree-
ment.
32. It rvas impossible from thc outset to make
a body w'ith 13 members a subsidiary body of an
organisation composed of l0 members There
should have bccn a formal rcvision of the modi-
fied Brusscls Treaty', as there rvas in 1954, to
take account of thc different categoncs of s[atus
accorded to the WEU associate countrres Onl1,
a formal revisron. not an imphcit or de facto one
of the sort rejected by'the Court of Justrce of the
European Communrties, as mentioncd abovc,
u'ould have made rt possrble to assimrlate WEAO
rn all respects u'rth a subsidiary bod1, of WEU
rvithrn the meanrng intended by, Artrcle VIII 2 of
the modified Brussels Treatl,
33. From the technical pornt of vierv therc are
even fervcr excuses for the absence of an1' such
revlslon grven that the first WEU subsidrary
bodl'. the Agency' for thc Control of Armaments,
$'as set up bi' r'irtue of a Protocol srgned on
28 October 1954 (Protocol No IV) and u,hrch.
after ratificatron. entered into force at the same
trme as the Protocol of 23 Octobcr 1954 modi&-
rng and completrng the Brussels Treatt,. rn pur-
suance of a spccial clause in Artrcle IV of the
lafter Protocol (see paragraph l)
34 But that rs not all. For apphcatron of the
Pans Agreemcnt to be effectrve. there is a re-
quirement. ln partlcular rn the provlslons con-
tarned rn Artrcles 2,8.9, l2 to 15, 21 and 22, for
the WEU member statcs to cooperate, erther
drrectll' or rndrrectlr,. through the WEU Councrl
Implcmentatron of the Parrs Agrcement rs, rn
princrple. guaranteed b1' cooperatron of a gcncral
nature betueen WEU and its members (Artrcle 2)
and rt rs thrs that u'ould grve rise to problcms.
imaginable or othenvise, rf there u'as a move to
apply' thc Agreement to countrres that arc not
members of WEU but partrcipate in WEAO
35. This explains uh1' paragraph 8(a) of the
WEAO Charter making that bod1, ''an integral
part of the WEU" rvithout an1, revisron of the
statutorl,tcxts governing WEU has to be consid-
ered rvith the greatest reservation. The same lack
of a legal base apphes to paragraph 8(b) of the
Chartcr u,hrch states that WEAO u'ill share in
the international personality of WEU as rvell as
in the juridrcal personalrty that WEU possesses
by virtuc of Article 3 of the Paris Agreement on
the status of the Organrsation
36. Thrs provisron can bc contested all thc
more rn that it makes provision for thc &ssolu-
tion of WEAO's legal personalrtl' and its sub-
sumption in that of WEU v'hen (a) the legal per-
sonality of WEAO has not been establishcd in
accordance u'ith the customar), procedures of
general public intcrnational law' and of the na-
tional lau's of the member states, and (b) WEAO
comprises alongside the WEU member countries
states that are not members of the Unron
37. Srnce the WEU Councrl does not have the
vested po\\'ers necessan/ to create subsrdiary
bodrcs that also includc states that are not mem-
bers of WEU, srth a lcgal personalrtv subsumed
in that of WEU. the entire legal legrtrmao, of the
proccss is open to challengc
38. Another srtuation open to legal challenge rs
to be found in the exchange of letters betrvecn thc
WEU Charrman-in-Office and non-member
states particlpatlng in WEAO under the terms of
the Charter.
39. There are some hmrts concernrng WEU's
legal personalrtv that should not be forgotten
The legal personalrtl, provrded for rn Article 3 of
the Agreement on the status of WEU refers onl1,
to rts capacitv to conclude contracts and take
such action as rcferred to rn subsequent provi-
srons The legal personalrtv referred to rs that of
thc capacrtl of natural or legal persons actlng
u'rthrn thc natronal laus of the states
40 As far as lcgal personalitr rn thc rnter-
natronal lcgal s1'stem rs concerned. rt should be
noted that there is no provisron rn erther the
modified Brussels Trea['or the Pans Agreement
that exprcssl"'empou'ers WEU to conclude intcr-
national agreements. Hou'ever, such competence
is imphcrtly recognised bv vrrtue of the provr-
stons hmrting or restrictrng thc \\av lt ts exer-
cised
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41. Thus, in the modified Brussels Treaty
WEU's internatronal relations are confined to
cooperation with other European organisations
(Article VIII.I) and rvith NATO (Article IV).
Similarly, Article 27 of the Paris Agreement res-
tricts WEU's intemational legal business and
contractual relations to rts dealings with the
member states. Was the rntention bchind Article
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, creating the
WEU Council and specifuing its powers and
functions, and Article I of the Paris Agreement,
making provision for an "Organisation" consti-
tuted by the High Contracting Parties to the
Treaty', also to create in its framervork an inter-
national legal person possessing all the qualifica-
tions and authority to deal with all the other in-
temational organisations (excluding the Euro-
pean organrsatlons and NATO) and with all
states other than WEU members, that is to say
those that are not members of WEU because thcy
are not parties to the Brussels Treaty and the
Paris Agreement?
42. This question calls for a cautious answer
in vieu, of the nature of WEU and the practice it
follori's.
43. In the first place it ls necessar) to examine
the specific naturc of WEU, which came tnto
existence late in the day when a Treaty that had
bcen signed b1' thc contracting po\r'ers over six
years earlier (on 17 March 1948) rvas revised
and supplemented. Provisron for WEU's legal
personah[, rvas made rmphcitlf in the Protocol
of 23 October 1954 and rvas later grven specrfic
mention rn the Paris Agreement on the status of
WEU, srgned on I I May 1955 (rt entered into
force m the srgnaton'countnes on l9 July 1956).
But none of these legal instruments contained an
explicrt, or even an imphcit. reference to WEU's
universal competence to conclude mternational
agreements (except in the case of tts mcmber
states. mternational organisations and NATO).
44 Thrs is because WEU is one of the least
institutronalised rntemational organrsations rn the
u'orld The High Contracting Partres did not
delegate their porvers to concludc rnternailonal
agreements erther to WEU or to its Council In
concluding the modified Brussels Trcaty' they
kcpt their rcsrdual po\\ers intact.
45. An1- pooling of their sovereign powers \\'as
reduced to a minrmum and confined to Artrcles
VI and VII of the Treaty The culminatron of
this distinctive approach rn the modified Brussels
Treaty is to be found in Article V rvhich makes
provision for military aid and assistance between
the allies m the event ofany state being the object
of an armed at[ack in Europe b1'another state.
46. In such a srtuation the aid and assistance
in question would not be provided by either WEU
or as a result of a decrsron taken b1' the WEU
Council but by the contracting porvers them-
selves in accordance with their obligations under
Article 5l of the Charter of the United Nations
and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.
More emphasis is laid on the relational approach
adopted in the Treaty than on its institutional
approach2. Great care has to be taken in unrav-
elling the competence which - in contrast to the
case of the European Communities 
- 
is implicit
in the modified Brussels Treaty.
47. Thcre is of course the Rome document,
rvhich rvas signed betwcen WEU and three states
that were not members of the Organisation (20
November 1992) al a mcetrng of the ministers of
the then nrne WEU countnes and those of the
threc NATO member statcs which had been rn-
vited to become ''assocrate" members of WEU
and had accepted.
48. The ministers took care not to call the in-
strument encompassing the invitation and its ac-
ceptance an international "agreement". They
referred to a "document", that is, an instrument
wth no label. There rs no provlslon in the
modified Brusscls Trcaty or the Pans Agreement
for the status of assoclate member. And the
document rs careful to polnt out that rt does not
entail any' changes to the modrfied Brussels
Treaty. Thus there \\'as no implicit revision of
the Treaty as a result of srgnature of the docu-
ment (see paragraph 3 of the document) It
lvould therefore be difficult to argue that the
Rome "document'' sets an (imphcit) preccdent
and rs the first step touards recognising that
WEU's internailonal legal personality extcnds to
international legal persons other than its member
statcs, the European organlsatlons and NATO
' enotir., .*ample of the relatronal approach concems
the admrssion of nerr members It is not the Council
that invites countnes to Jorn WEU but the High
Contracting Partics v'fuch reach agreement with an
applicant on the condrtions for rts accesston (see Arttcle
XI of the modrficd Bn:ssels Treatl')
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49. Neither do any consequences for WEU's
international legal personality arise from the
precedent set by the "document" srgned in Lux-
embourg on 9 May, 1994 at the meeting betrveen
the WEU Council of Minrsters and the foreign
affairs ministers of the three Baltic states and the
six former Warsau' Pact states, rvhereby those
countries that are not members of NATO became
"associate partners of WEU"
50. No provision was made in the modrfied
Brussels Trea[,for such associate partner status
and the "document" also states that "This status
does not entail any changes to the modified Brus-
sels Treat1," (last line of the preamble) Accord-
ing to the communiqud issued at the close of the
Luxembourg meetlng, in respect of rvhich the
states accepting the status "of association"
"associated themselves rvith the relevant pas-
sages", ministers "adopted solemnly the docu-
ment".
5 I This precedent docs not constrtute a devel-
opment in the recognrtron of WEU's rnternational
legal personalitr,.
52 It is against the background of a legal per-
sonalitv that rs limrtcd because it is based on a
specrfic decision that the exchange of letters of
30 March 1994 and l9 November 1996 (Ostend)
betxeen the WEU Chairman-rn-Office and the
respectrve mlnlsters of Denmark, Norway and
Turkel'- three countries that are not membcrs of
WEU but are particrpatrng m WEAO 
- 
have to
be examined
53. There are grounds for doubts about the
legal value of the agreement constrtuted by, the
exchange of letters betrveen the three partrcrpants
and the WEU Charrman-in-Office
54 Another striking feature rs the fact that on
the basis of a mandate from the Counctl, and
outstde rts framework proper. the Charrman-rn-
Office proceeded urth the exchange of letters
necessan' to gr.ie formal e\presston to the
agrecment reached on the fuil and equal partrcr-
patron of the threc non-WEU states rn WEAO.
u'htch u-as created folloivrng the adoptron of rts
Charter bv a decision of the Council (the l0).
55. Thc apparentlf insurmountable legal
problem of thc WEU Councrl making WEAO a
subsrdiarl' body of WEU has been described car-
her (sce paragraph 19) and nceds no furthcr drs-
cussion here.
56. Hou,ever, another difficulty of the same
order concerns the application of the Agreement
on the status of Western European Union (in
particular as regards privileges and immunrties
accorded to member countries, national represen-
tatlves and the lnternatronal staff) to the coun-
tries participating in WEAO that are not con-
tracting parties to the modified Brussels Treat_v
or, a fortiorr, signatories of the Agreement in
question.
57. In reply, to the letters from the ministers of
the countries participating in WEAO but not
members of WEU, giving notification of therr
governments' acceptance of apphcation of the
Paris Agreement, the Chairman-in-Offrce of the
Council confirmed, on the basis of the mandate
he had received, that the terms of the Agreement
applied to WEAO actrvrtres. It should be noted
that the exchange ofletters rvas not the sublect of
an1' ratrfication or parliamentary approval. This
calls for a number of comments.
58 In the first placc the Council does not have
the pori'er to decide to apply the Agreement to
third partres Its compctence in this respect has
not been proved. The Charrman's replies to the
letters from the three partrcrpating states, non-
membcrs of WEU, requrred a lcgal basis because
the Hrgh Contracting Partres could not conduct
an exchange of letters makrng provisron for ap-
phcatron of the Agreement to the representatrves
ofthose threc states and to thcrr natronals belong-
rng to the intematronal staffof WEU
59. The Councrl's competence to conclude
addrtronal agreements for the purpose of imple-
mentlng the Pans Agreement rs confincd to those
concluded s,ith the mcmber states of WEU (see
Artrcle 27 of the Agreement)
60 The Councrl had even less authorrtt, to
cxtend the Agreement. rn so far as WEAO ac-
trvrtics \\'ere concerncd, to the three partrctpating
states rn questron grvcn that smce the exchange
of leffcrs x,as not sub.;cct to a ratification proc-
ess. it could not have anv brndrng effects that
could bc invoked before thc natronal courts and
parhaments of the modrficd Brussels Treaty
powers Thc rrghts of thc threc WEAO partrci-
patrng states thcreforc go no further than rvhat rs
knonn as comttas genttum ln rnternatronal
crrcles But rn terms of the larv and its applica-
tron, therr pnvrlcges and rmmunrtres have no
lcgal basis, exccpt pcrhaps rn the Unrted Krng-
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dom where, by a simple decision of the Execu-
tive, an international organisatron may, mercly
by virtue of being included on a given hst, enloy
the privileges and immunities specified in a
national law ofa general nature (see the Interna-
fional Organisation Act of 1968).
61. All this means that the pnvileges and im-
munities of the three participating states cannot
be invoked before any judicial body in the mem-
ber states. The replies of the Chairman-in-Offrce
to the letters addressed to him by the three coun-
tries bear the stamp of lvhat could be described
as going bey'ond the bounds of authority (ultra
vtres) or as an "invalidating factor of consent"
especially as notification of application of the
Agreement b1' the Charrman-in-Office was ln
response to prior notification on the part of the
particrpating states
62. It should also be noted that of the thrcc
countries, only Turkel, made its agreement to
apply the Paris Agreement conditional upon
meeting national legislative requlrements, therebl'
complying nith the larv. Hou'ever, this u,as not
matched b1' a reciprocal commitment on the part
of the Hrgh Contractrng Parties.
63. It rs true that some precautions rvere taken
to prevent a matter being submitted to natronal
jurisdrction.
64 Thus under paragraph ll(b) of the Char-
ter, a contract conciuded bv WEAO rvith a firm
has to contaln an arbrtratron clause rvhereby any
drsputes concemlng such contracts are subject to
arbitratron bv a tnbunal and are excluded from
national junsdictron The content of this
"standard" arbrtratron clause rs set out rn Annex
III to the WEAO Charter.
65. Similarly, the Charter makes provrsron for
the settlement of WEAO drsputes of a pnvate
character and "of an ongm other than contrac-
tual" in accordance s'ith Artrcle 26 of thc Parrs
Agreement, and of drsputes rnvolving WEAO
staff rvho do not en;ov the pnvileges and rmmu-
nities accorded bv the Pans Agreement.
66 Lastlr', an even more exccptronal fcature is
that the Memorandum of Understanding signed rn
Ostend by' the 13 defencc ministers of the par-
ticipatrng states prevents WEAO disputes from
being referred to an1' national or intemational
tribunal (Sectron l4 l)
6'l The scope of this provision is probabll' far
more extensive than might be imagined at first
srght. The Memorandum of Understandrng con-
tains many refercnces to the Charter, therebv
incorporating the provisions of the latter rn the
MOU by virtue of the referral procedure It is
therefore likely that a number of problems in-
volving contradictions or incompatrbrlities be-
trveen the Charter and the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding rvill arisc for as long as no rules or
procedur,ls have been cstablished to settle them.
68. Furthermore. the clauses ruling out re-
course tc, national tribunals, rvhich have no con-
sequences for disputes other than those for u'hich
provision is made, cannot produce any legal ef-
fects in r,3spect of those tribunals given that none
of them rrs subject to the ratrfication procedure.
69. In addrtion, the provrsron of the Charter
subsumirrg WEAO's legal personaliry' in that of
WEU (paragraph 8) has no effect rn the natronal
larvs of tlhe member states and certainly has none
in the las's of countries that are not members of
WEU given that the Charter has not been subject
to a ratification procedurc that u'ould make rt
applicable under the lau's of the partrcipating
states or enable rt to be invoked before national
tnbunals
70. All this shou's hou' precarrous thc legal
status of WEAO rs. as estabhshed by its Charter,
Memorandum of Understandrng and the ex-
change of letters betrveen the Chairman-in-Offrce
and each partlclpatlng country not a member of
WEU
71. Ttre srtuation rs equalll' precarious tn res-
pcct of thc full participation and equal rights and
obligations confi rmed by the Charrman-in-Offi ce
of WEU in his repll' to the ministers of the par-
trcrpatin6; countnes that are not membcrs of
WEU, rvrth regard to the Assembly of WEU
u'hrch is called upon to perform rts dutres vrs-a-
vrs WEAO as an rntegral part of WEU
72. Srnce WEAO is an rntegral part of WEU,
shanng rn thc jundical pcrsonalrtv of the latter
(paragraph 8 of the Charter), its Board of Direc-
tors has to provrde the WEU Councrl of Minis-
ters with an annual rcport (paragraph 36 of the
Charter) In addrtron, as WEAO u'as created as
a subsidrarl' bodv of WEU (paragraph 3) irres-
pectlve of rvhether or not this x'as correct, the
Council's annual report to the Parhamentary As-
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sembly of WEU must, in accordance u'ith Article
IX of the modified Brussels Treaty,, contarn a
section on WEAO.
73. This section may or may not correspond to
the WEAO Board of Drrectors' rcport rcferred to
in paragraph 36 of the Charter. But in anv cvent
an appropriate descriptron of its activities must
be included in the ministers' report to the
Asscmbll,
74. The amual report rs the sub.;ect of a de-
bate in thc Assembll' u,hich rephes to rt (Article
V of the Charter of the Assembly). The report
may prompt the Assembly to give an opinion or
make a recommendation (see Rule 30 of the
Assembly's Rules of Procedure).
75. But reprcsentativcs of the assoclate mem-
ber countries cannot take part in Assembly de-
bates on the annual report (see Rule 16.2 (d) of
the Rules ofProcedure). They cannot even spcak
during debates on thc Council's report. eithcr at
the plenary session or rn corrrmlttee. and nor can
the1, vote on or move amendments to the
Assembll"s repll' to the Councrl (see Rule 16 2
@)
76. Thrs situation of "rnferiontv" rn rvhich
such representatives to the Assembll, find them-
selves applies a forfion to representatives of the
obsen'er countnes According to the definition
of WEU rn the Parrs Agreement (Article l). the
Asscmblv ls one of thc components of the Or-
ganisation
77. The fact that WEU assocrate member and
observer countnes participating rn WEAO are rn
thrs infcrror srtuation rs in total contradiction
u'ith the undertakrngs glvcn to them rn the ex-
change of letters betrvecn therr mrnisters and the
Chairman-in-Office of WEU that are annexed to
the WEAO Charter That exchange of letters
provrded the assocrate members u'rth a guarantec
as to their equal rrghts and obhgatrons rn WEAO.
a subsidiary bodv of WEU
78. Moreover, full participatlon and equal
rrghts for the 13 IEPG (later WEAG) countrres
rvere foundcd rn the Petersberg Declaratron of I9
June 1992 accordrng to rvhich the transfer of
IEPG actrvrtrcs to WEU rvould not affect their
equal nghts For WEAO activities thev rvere to
have the same rrghts and obligations as full
members of WEU Thrs therefore made the Pans
Agreement appiicablc to them. Provisron for the
application of all othcr WEU texts rvas also
made in the reply of the WEU Chairrnan-ln-
Office, of 14 March 1994, to the letter from the
Danish Minister, given that the Paris Agreement
u,as considered to be an example of thc texts
govcrning Western European Uruon that rvere to
apply to non-member countries in relation to
WEAO actrvrties transferred from WEAG.
Furthermore, this equality' of status for WEAO
particrpants that are members of WEU and non-
member countrics of WEU alike lvas the subject
of a formal request by the 13 WEAG countries
that WEAO be granted the status of a WEU
subsidiary body' (see the second recrtal of the
preamble to the WEAO Charter) and u'as estab-
hshed in paragraph I of the WEAO Charter
79. That paragraph, referring to the Petersberg
Declaration of 19 June 1992 and the Bonn com-
munique of 4 Deccmber 19923, confirmed thc
equality of WEU membcrs and non-members in
the new rnstrtutional frameu'ork of WEAG as a
result of rts transfer from NATO to WEU, rvrth
all rights acqurred in NATO remarnlng in force
despite the transfer and berng sublect to ncu'
practlcal arrangements for therr application rn
vrerv of the specific charactenstrcs of WEU
80 Hou,el'er, the inequalitl' rnherent in this
status is to be found not onlv in the Assembly of
WEU but rn the Councrl as u'ell.
8l Indecd, under the terms of the Rome
"document" assocrate members ma1,be excluded
from partrcrpating rn the WEU Council at the
request of a majontl' of full member states; they,
cannot block a dccrsion once it rs the subject of
consensus among the member states. anv asso-
cration on thcir part s,ith a decision taken b.v thc
Council may bc rcfuscd bv a ma.;ont1' of member
states or bv half the member states rncludrng the
Presrdency (see paragraph 3 of the Rome docu-
ment).
-t rh"rld be noted that the Petersberg Declaratron of
19 Junc 1992 and the Bonn commumque of 4
Drcembcr 1992 are proper mternational agreements
urtl mandatory cffccts (see Article 2 of the UN Vienna
Con'cntron on thc Larv of Treatres) rvhereas the Rome
document on the status of member countnes has been
considered as supposedli' berng mainll' polrtical in
nahre As such thc Romc documcnt of 20 November
1992 is clearlv do,'oid of any'legal forcc
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82. In the case of WEAO, its status and
Chartcr rvere adopted b1, the WEU Council
rvhich alone can revise the Charter and dissolve
WEAO (paragraph 5 of thc Charter)
83. It is truc that before the Council can cxer-
cise thrs authority, a jornt request has to be madc
for it to do so by the WEAO participating states.
84 Horvevcr, should the non-member coun-
tries rvant a rcvision of the Chartcr agarnst the
rvishes of othcr countries that are mcmbers of
WEU, no such rcvision can take place even rf
those opposing it are in a tinv mrnority. Simi-
larly,, countries that are particrpants rn WEAO
but are not membcrs of WEU may' bc cxcluded,
subject to the abovementroncd Rome
"document", from an)' decrsions the WEU
Council has authorrty to take concernrng WEAO
as a subsidiary body' rvrthin the meaning of Ar-
trcle VIII.2 of the modified Brussels Treaty.
85. The same applies to decrsrons the WEU
Council has to take concernrng WEAO, in pur-
suancc of its Charter and in particular para-
graphs 10, ll (c),35 and 40
86. It follous from the foregoing that rn legal
situations there is no equalrtv betu'een WEU
members and non-members erther in the Council
of Ministers or in the Parhamentary Assembly'
despite all the undertakrngs of the WEU member
states that havc been repeated, confirmed and
declared.
8'1 . It u'ould appear that no svstematlc concern
for full legaliry'rs to be found rn the texts adopted
by the WEU Councrl as regards the status of the
WEAO partrcipatrng countnes that are not mem-
bers of WEU
88 As has been sard carher. the samc short-
comrng appiies to the modrfied Brussels Treatl'
and the Paris Agreement u'hen it comes to thc
status of a subsidrarl'bod1'and the pnvrleges and
immunrhcs of WEAO
89 But thrs rs not all In thc WEU Council's
decision adopting the WEAO Chartcr. thc
Council put a (statutory') hmrt on rts po\\'ers
The terms of paragraph 5 of the Charter shackle
its freedom to act as rt cannot drssolve WEAO or
amend or revoke the decrsion b1'which rt adopted
rts Charter unless rt recerves a lornt rcquest from
all the partrcrpatrng statcs to do so.
90. This constitutes a self-restriction amount-
ing to a conditional constraint imposed on thc
Councrl's exercise of its pou'ers as defined in the
modified Brussels Treatl'. It remains to be
proved that such an innovation is consistent wrth
the larv.
Conclusions
91. To sum up, WEAO's legal situation as
defined in Ostend on 16 November 1996 is not
consistenLt rvith general public intematronal larv
or u'ith the larv denvrng from the modified Brus-
sels Treat1,. Thrs rs because:
(a,l WEAO, composed of WEU member
countries and non-member countncs, can-
not be consrdercd as a subsidrarl,bodl'of
WEU as generalll' understood and particu-
larly' u,ithrn the meanrng of Article VIII.2
of the modified Brussels Treaty'.
(b,) Its Charter has no more than drplo-
matrc value 
- 
it cannot produce rts full
efltcts u,ithout berng ratified by the
natronal parhaments or urthout formal re-
vrsron of the 1954 modified Brussels
Treaty.
Some natronal parhaments may not
consider contnbutrons to WEAO to be
mandatory cxpendilure for therr countries
given that thcv u'ere not mvolvcd rn the
Organrsation's creatlon or in the procedure
authorising the conclusion of its Charter
@ The WEU Councrl canxot extend
applicatron of the I955 Paris Agrccment
on the pnvrleges and rmmunrties accorded
to WEU to countries that are not membcrs
of the latter but that partrcrpate rn WEAO
In this respect the Charter could srmpll' be
ignored b), national tnbunals of particrpat-
rngg states in a srtuatron calhng for its ap-
phcatron in a lau,surt
(d,,' Thc assurance of equal rrghts and
full particrpatron grven to the assoclate
member and observer countncs rs an artr-
ficral one bccausc of the status of those
countncs rn thc Council and Asscmblv of
WEU
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